August 16, 2022

Election Security in a Time of Disturbance

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Understanding the Guide

A guide to assist election officials in planning defenses against threats from individuals, organized groups and spontaneous groupings who pose an open challenge to the order, safety or procedural integrity of the central election office and counting sites, other high-profile election facilities, and even voting sites.

Using the Guide

Table of Contents

1. Background
2. Risk Management Approach
3. Staff and Poll Worker Guidance
4. Managing the Relationship with Observers
5. Breaking Up Unruly, Disruptive Crowds
6. Legal Advice and the Authoritative Presence of Attorneys
7. Facilities Preparation
8. Law Enforcement and Security Staff
9. Communications About Deterring Intimidation
10. Potential Scenarios
11. Appendix A: Checklist for Preparedness and Prevention
12. Appendix B: References for Preventing Cyber and Covert Attacks

Background

We have seen, and fear we will see again, overt security events: intentional efforts and opportunistic attempts to use an intimidating presence, threats, and even violence to influence and alter election procedures and outcomes.

Potential threats exist across a continuum. An angry individual or distrustful observer could disrupt election activities. A group could arrive at an election facility without disruptive intentions. Or anxious, misinformed cynicism from electors at a voting facility can act like fiber optic cable, channeling rumor, innuendo, misunderstanding and anger, and generating a mob mentality. More intentional groups ranging from supporters of a candidate to self-styled militia and other extremist groups may also attempt to gain influence over processing or voting facilities and procedures. The impact of intimidation at a voting site may be local and involve lower numbers, but ripples of news and gossip can spread fear in the broader community. A strong and immediate response can help calm concerns and limit the damage.

Election officials must protect a range of facilities over which they have varying degrees of control, ranging from central sites, typically owned by the jurisdiction, where mail ballot handling, tally and other back-office procedures may take place, to mail ballot drop boxes in open public space, to private and government buildings used as voting sites.

Since the contours of vulnerability rise and fall with factors such as the number of ballots, the timing of work and the potential for undermining voter morale and confidence, these factors should shape an administrator’s planning. The large number of mail ballots issued in 2020 (due to the coronavirus pandemic), the novelty of mail voting in many states, and the suspicion that was generated may make them targets for protest. Attention on the mail ballot count is likely to peak in the jurisdictions where a small number of votes may be decisive, increasing public focus, tension and the potential for risk.

Central count sites require significant, focused preventive planning, including the hardening of both physical and human defenses. Protective efforts can help deter interference, if they are publicized, but the exact methods should not be publicized to avoid allowing disruptors to devise ways of circumventing security. Election officials should consider ways to harden physical defenses and make plans to deter, de-escalate, defend and mitigate damage if such situations develop, without excluding observers, who are essential participants in elections.

The risk of intimidation of election workers or violence directed at voting or ballot counts remains low in most jurisdictions, even in a turbulent time in the United States. We do not mean to suggest that overt threats to the election are likely for any specific office. We offer this guidance because preparedness will help you reassure voters and workers, deter and de-escalate threats, and ensure an attack would not succeed.

Risk Management Approach

Election officials are advised to take a risk management approach, focusing attention and resources on high-risk locations like central offices and ballot counting facilities, and assessing voting sites by the expected number of voters there. Fortunately, officials have significant levels of control over central offices and counting facilities and can therefore institute mitigation measures. We include a Checklist (Appendix A) to help election officials take steps to safeguard their facilities and prepare their staff.

This paper does not offer guidance to address covert physical threats, such as theft, infiltration, tampering and vandalism, although the topics overlap. Such risks have been addressed by many authorities, and election officials needing such guidance can consult Appendix B – References for Preventing Cyber and Covert Attacks.

Coordinated Planning

An election administrator should coordinate planning in these six areas:

• Staff and Poll Worker Guidance

• Conduct of Election Observers

• Legal Advice and Attorney Authority

• Facilities Preparation

• Law Enforcement and Security Staff

• Communications

Bringing together representatives involved in each area of each group for a coordinating meeting or call will help to ensure that each group understands the needs of other participants.

Election procedures and the viewpoints of staff and poll workers will need to shape the law enforcement response, and the perspective of law enforcement and security should help guide election administrators as they develop procedures and guidelines. Inviting training staff or others in close contact with poll workers can help to ensure their viewpoints, which will differ from election administrators, are represented.

Staff and Poll Worker Guidance

Staff and poll workers, especially those working in central facilities, have two critical goals: managing the relationship with observers, since a disruption of this kind can quickly escalate; and breaking up disruptive crowds by pulling individuals and small groups into separate spaces.

Before addressing these goals, the following principles should guide training for staff when addressing intimidation in election facilities, and should be incorporated into communications with poll workers:

• Security, Support and Seeking Protection

• Command of Relevant Law and Procedure

• Transparency

• De-Escalation

Security, Support, and Seeking Protection

Poll workers and staff must be trained to be vigilant. Greeters and frontline staff should watch for behavior that looks unusual. Anything that feels unusual, suspicious or threatening should be reported up, at minimum to senior staff in the office, or to law enforcement.

A two-person rule (or “buddy system”) can provide security and reassurance. If a situation becomes contentious, staff or poll workers should call in a colleague for support, to serve as witness and to help document the incident afterwards.

It may seem too obvious to mention, but the essence of standing up to fear tactics is to give people a sense of security and protect the integrity of the election. Staff and poll workers may feel intimidated, possibly in ways that make them consciously and unconsciously bend rules and procedures to mollify those they feel threatened by, unless election officials provide them with adequate training on processes and the confidence that they will be supported and protected. That means empowering them to call for help if they feel intimidated or they see voters who are intimidated. That includes calling law enforcement directly, if necessary.

Election officials must relay to staff and poll workers that it is acceptable to call law enforcement when necessary. Provide staff and poll workers phone numbers for local law enforcement.

Command of Relevant Law and Procedure

Poll workers with a thorough command of election procedures, who communicate confidently about them, can deflate an upset observer or partisan.

One of the most critical procedures to understand will be the distinction between observation and disturbance. The role, rights and responsibilities of observers are well defined in most states. Those who push beyond appropriate roles are creating a disturbance and can be warned or removed.

Election officials should ensure that poll workers understand state law and regulations regarding challenges to a voter’s right to vote. States vary on the circumstances in which a voter may be challenged, by whom; and how poll workers should resolve the issue. Spurious challenges by an election observer that unduly delay legitimate voters may create grounds for removal.

Signage regarding state laws on voter intimidation should be posted in all voting sites where all persons can easily read them, in order to help voters and poll workers recognize behavior that isn’t permitted and needs to be addressed.

Transparency

The strongest argument for transparency is to ensure that American elections are secure and honest. Demonstrating open processes and strict adherence to rules and best practices can dissolve cynicism and attempts at misinformation. Some of the discussion in this guide treats the relationship with observers as adversarial, and it can be. But election officials and workers should always keep in mind the important role observers play. Even while taking steps to ensure safety and Covid-19 safety, efforts must be made to allow observers to witness all relevant procedures and activities.

De-Escalation

Dealing with unruly and overzealous voters and observers is all in a day’s work for election workers. But the climate of distrust could make these encounters more volatile this year.

Training staff and informing poll workers of these de-escalation tactics can help keep contention from spilling over into conflict:

• Speak with a calm voice and communicate with posture and facial expression that you believe the observer will be satisfied once you explain how procedures ensure the integrity of the vote.

• Conduct yourself with firm but polite professionalism to help defuse disruptive situations.

• Remember that even angry observers are usually acting in good faith. This may help you understand and successfully address their concerns.

• Communicate in a manner that demonstrates you are taking the concern seriously, such as “I want to make sure we know exactly what happened here, so everyone is satisfied that we’ve handled it correctly.”

• Be specific when explaining law, local practice and procedures so that voters and observers know the rules and their boundaries.

Managing the Relationship with Observers

Serious conflicts may develop through the escalation of normal observer conflicts and misunderstandings in the context of heightened distrust, anxiety and high stakes.

Always keep in mind that the right to observe helps to establish the fairness of an election. In the broad light of day, people can see that American elections are honest. Election observation builds that trust and helps to enforce the rules that maintain it. In contrast, attempts to limit observation inevitably undermine public trust.

Administrators must clearly communicate and enforce rules for election observers in order to prevent disruption, so that voting, the vote count and legal observation can continue.

Recommendations include:

• Create a formal intake process for observers, including all statutory forms and procedures. If permitted by statute, ask observers for ID (with an alternative for those who lack ID).

• Create a color-coded system of badges on lanyards to distinguish roles or access, with corresponding signage indicating which color badges have access to each area.

• Require a signature on a declaration form disavowing any intent to disrupt election workers or legitimate processes.

• Provide training if possible, or guidance materials on standards of behavior for observers in order to help prevent conflict over uncertain rules.

  • Even where the right of observation is not limited to those sponsored by a candidate or party, it may be possible to require or strongly encourage an understanding of procedures being observed before being admitted.

• It can be helpful to assign specific staff as liaison to observers, ideally someone with experience speaking to partisans.

• Define supervision and authority ahead of time. Layers of authority will allow defense in depth, giving front line staff the option to refer complaints to a higher level. Because this strategy can risk distracting senior managers too quickly, consider the option of artificial authority, where a staffer refers a disruptive person to a colleague who is not actually senior, but can speak more firmly.

• Promptly address observers who are loud or disruptive, even in minimal ways, since the behavior can be contagious, drawing in a crowd.

If health codes continue to limit the number of observers that can be allowed in an election facility, consider how to manage the impact.

Remember that the right of observation helps to allay the concerns of the skeptics. If you must keep some observers out, work to ensure that different constituencies are represented by those who remain. This will reinforce the understanding that the election is run honestly.

Breaking Up Unruly, Disruptive Crowds

It is possible that a group may gather spontaneously at a voting location or election facility, without intention of formal observation. One of the dangers of larger groups of people is their volatility and susceptibility to rumor.

Below we discuss strategies that may be helpful in disrupting potentially unruly crowds:

• Accommodate Legitimate Concerns

• Direct Focus Towards Legal Procedures

Recognize Concerns

The intentions of many people coming to an election facility will be to assure that voting or vote-counting is conducted honestly, even when they bring mistaken preconceptions about you, election workers, and the process as a whole. Helping them understand that rules are well thought out and rigidly enforced, and offering appropriate opportunities to observe, if legally permissible, may mollify antagonism and help ensure that people remain calm.

Direct Focus Toward Legal Procedures

A critical risk factor is the susceptibility of crowds to rumor, and that danger is exacerbated when the crowd has no constructive focus. One key strategy is to redirect the attention of the group on legal procedures and legitimate pathways for observation and complaint. We recommend creating written guides to procedures that are not so long as to be overwhelming, but with sufficient detail that they require some sustained focus. Providing a group with printed materials will refocus some members of the group towards understanding your procedures and provide a constructive topic of conversation for the crowd.

Legal Advice and the Authoritative Presence of Attorneys

Bringing an attorney into consultations on security plans and responses to intimidation and violence will ensure that policy responses don’t cross legal lines or infringe on rights. Seeking formal legal opinions can also strengthen the impact of your actions, explicitly covering them with the mantle of the law. And an attorney on scene can sometimes provide an authoritative voice that will help resolve difficult situations.

Consider seeking written legal opinions on these and other questions to help reinforce your policies and procedures:

• The number of people allowed in election facilities.

• Whether filming, audio recording or photography is allowed and in what context.

• What types of disruptive behavior can lead to expulsion from an election facility, such as noise, crossing physical distancing lines or other barriers, or repetitive unsuccessful challenges or complaints.

• The legality of firearms in and around voting sites and other election facilities.

• Whether voters waiting in line outdoors are protected by rules on electioneering.

• Whether visitors or observers may be asked to sign a declaration explicitly disavowing any intention to disrupt poll workers or influence them on questions of legal procedure.

Explain policies to staff and poll workers. Consider the following:

• Print relevant legal opinions on jurisdiction letterhead for distribution when the polls are open.

• Create signage to help reinforce legal boundaries and restrictions for observers and other visitors.

• Acknowledge that the display of weapons may create legitimate concern, even if that display is legal, and explain the alternatives available under state law to election workers who feel intimidated.

Invite your attorney to participate in security planning and meetings with law enforcement, as well as work on-site at your central count facility on Election Day, and beforehand if desired. The authoritative presence of an attorney and the deference many people give to lawyers can help enforce these and other policies in election facilities where disputes arise. Depending on the assessment of need, it may also be useful to supplement any jurisdiction attorney(s) with outside lawyers on-call to travel to sites of disturbance.

Facilities Preparation

Security-related preparation of voting sites may include delimitation of observer areas (if possible), since enforcing these limits may help reduce the number of people in an unruly crowd.

Where possible, consider posting poll workers as greeters inside and/or outside the entrance. Training them to identify early signs of developing problems will be beneficial. While greeters handle expected tasks like Covid-19 safety and answering typical voting questions, they can also monitor the line for contentious situations that could escalate, or suspicious activity that might be a first sign of someone with malevolent intentions.

At the central office and mail ballot processing site, facilities preparation will be a critical component of security preparation, and should address the following issues:

• Traffic control around the facility.

• Protecting the vehicle zone, entrance and receiving area where tally cartridges, secure ballot bags and other secure election materials are received.

• A check-in desk with security staff to control observer and public entry into the facility.

• A neutral space outside or beyond the check-in desk, to prevent crowds from forming at the check-in desk itself.

  • (For instance, have security staff at a door, allowing a limited number of people in to have their ID examined at a check-in desk).

• Internal control points around tally computers and storage areas.

• A designated meeting room where senior staff can meet with observers or leaders of observer groups, in order to pull them away from the intake area or to separate unruly crowds into smaller groups.

Posts or bollards, partitions and line ropes on stanchions can be useful in defining space for these needs.

Security cameras should be tested ahead of time to ensure they are working. Coverage of additional areas should be added if time and resources permit. Video coverage can also be used to supplement those observers permitted inside facilities.

If protest outside becomes raucous, consider insulating the workspace by drawing shades, closing internal doors to reduce sound and taking other steps to diminish the distraction and ensure that election work continues.

Let workers know you’ve planned for their safety, including routing them through a secure alternate entry/exit if possible, escorting them to their vehicles and ensuring they can drive away in security.

Law Enforcement and Security Staff

While much of the discussion above has focused on managing unruly individuals and crowds to prevent situations that might intimidate election workers, election officials today must recognize that attempts at intimidation may occur, either spontaneously or when groups intentionally come to disrupt the legal process.

Careful planning with law enforcement and security staff will be necessary to ensure that such attempts fail. The first step is simply reaching out to all relevant police and security agencies to create a relationship. Create documentation that informs them of the types of scenarios that may need to be addressed. Include legal advisers in calls and meetings so you can be sure that law enforcement is aware of election statutes, their interpretation and controlling authority.

Ask law enforcement about their preferred mode of communication for election incidents. Given that election scenarios are unique and high profile, is 911 the best path? Should the election administrator have a direct line? Should key staff have direct lines to a dedicated dispatch staffer? How should poll workers best relay their concerns over developing situations? Once you’ve clarified the response, make sure all staff and poll workers have the appropriate number, ideally keyed into their contact list.

Elections may be an unfamiliar context for law enforcement. The rights of voters and the right to observe and even challenge can create gray areas. Help them understand the boundaries between a legitimate complaint and disruption in the election context. It may be useful to engage law enforcement agents in training exercises in order to role-play some observer-poll worker disputes and other election situations.

Voting also creates restrictions on otherwise broadly respected rights. For instance, many states with relatively gun-friendly laws still have tight restrictions on guns in or even near voting sites.

Ultimately, law enforcement and security staff may be needed to deter intimidation, and possibly to address threatening individuals and intimidating groups. At the same time, as the events of the year have shown, a persistent law enforcement presence can itself feel overbearing to some voters, so law enforcement election activity must balance competing demands in the very different settings of voting sites and offices and central count facilities.

In a central count facility, where there is little if any risk of intimidating voters, and the risk of interference may be greater, law enforcement should be visible to deter interference and address unruly behavior promptly.

At voting sites, an ongoing police presence may be neither justified by the relatively low risk profile, nor constructive. Instead, law enforcement should be held in reserve, prepared to respond and address disruptive behavior at voting sites. To deter interference, it is advisable to communicate that readiness to the public, perhaps through a statement by the election administrator or a joint statement with law enforcement, describing behaviors that won’t be tolerated in or around voting sites and emphasizing that law enforcement will respond.

If known threats emerge, election officials should evaluate the benefits of a more visible police presence, from more regular patrols past voting sites, to brief or even consistent police posting at voting sites most in need of protection. The goal, of course, is to ensure that workers and voters feel safe, supported and protected.

If intimidating situations do develop, law enforcement will need to act. Here again, it is likely useful to role-play the types of situations that might develop and how law enforcement might act to address them while maintaining the ability of election officials and workers to do their jobs running the election. Elections exist in a delicate balance of contentious groups. Even in addressing a disturbance, law enforcement will need to distinguish between those creating the disturbance and legitimate participants and observers, to avoid undermining trust in the election.

In other years it might have gone without saying, but it seems necessary to make explicit this year that only constituted law enforcement agencies and security staff with a legal relationship to the jurisdiction should play a security/law enforcement role. Privately formed militia are explicitly outlawed from being present in or near voting sites in most, if not all states.

Communications About Deterring Intimidation

It’s important to note that almost by definition, public opinion in your area will overwhelmingly support the counting of all your jurisdiction’s votes according to established legal procedures. Any effort by intimidating groups to bias the count is likely to be met with public revulsion, and that revulsion is a powerful ally to enlist.

It may be useful to speak to media on election day about legal procedures and law enforcement support. Let people know the election office will follow the law meticulously, and that law enforcement is ready to support the office in protecting the election.

A key strategy is to “speak to the skeptics.” People bring many preconceptions to their understanding of the fairness of elections. Address any rumors you’re aware of. Explain how the law and your own procedures prevent the kinds of violations alleged and establish election integrity.

The best way to speak to skeptics may be by enlisting bipartisan voices to support the election office and the legal procedures for counting ballots. A copy of The Elections Group publication Managing Expectations for Election Results (see Appendix B) offers further ideas for informing election stakeholders in ways that help them appreciate the integrity of the process.

On the other hand, it may be useful not to publicize insignificant incidents or those that you have not yet fully addressed, to avoid creating undue alarm and magnifying the intimidation intended by the people creating the disturbance.

Potential Scenarios

These scenarios address major disruptions and potentially dangerous situations that could take place. They are meant to be suggestive, not exhaustive, and the lessons of these scenarios can be applied to other election facilities and incidents.

Appendix A: Checklist for Preparedness and Prevention

▢ Create an Intra-agency Security Team and arrange a conference call

▢ Invite representatives from facilities, poll worker training and communications units, as well as senior elections staff, attorneys, contracting security firms and law enforcement.

▢ Prepare Election Facilities in Advance

▢ Develop or enhance capacity to provide for online observation of election processes.

▢ Set location capacity limits and clearly post those limits for each work area and for the entire facility.

▢ Secure entrances, including vehicle/receiving entrances. Use rope lines, bollards and other barriers as necessary.

▢ Create secure areas and delineate boundaries for observers within the facility. Create color-coded badges for roles within the facility.

▢ Create signage detailing observer rules.

▢ Train Staff and Communicate with Poll Workers

▢ Reiterate observer rules, distinguishing observation from disruption.

▢ Set behavioral norms on noise, filming and other criteria that help workers distinguish legitimate observation from disruption.

▢ Provide de-escalation tips.

▢ Create a Guide for Observers and a Guide to Mail Ballot Processes.

▢ Provide phone numbers for emergency response when necessary. Emphasize that you recognize that they may need to call security or police directly if they feel threatened.

▢ Let staff and poll workers know you prioritize their safety.

▢ Set Law Enforcement Relationships and Expectations

▢ Build a relationship with law enforcement command. Seek advice and build a cohesive plan.

▢ Brief building security staff and municipal or county law enforcement on election policies.

▢ Request a direct line to designated command or dispatch personnel to ensure prompt and appropriate response.

▢ Determine best points of contact between law enforcement and different levels of election staff.

▢ Ask Communications Staff to Prepare to Address Disruption

▢ If the election office has no communications staff, seek outside assistance. Develop holding statements on disruption in advance.

▢ Share information with outside groups to further understanding of election law and procedures.

▢ Issue a statement to the news media regarding partnerships with law enforcement and describe behaviors that won’t be tolerated in or around voting sites.

▢ Seek bipartisan support that you can call on in a crisis.

▢ Get Legal Advice and Support

▢ Seek supporting legal opinions on key questions.

▢ Print copies to distribute to disruptive observers and visitors.

▢ Coordinate a pool of attorneys available to travel to address disruption on site, during early voting and on election day.

Appendix B: References for Preventing Cyber and Covert Attacks

Physical Security Preparedness at Voting Locations and Election Facilities (CISA)

Fact Sheets on Law Relating to Militias (Georgetown Univ. Law School)

Fact Sheet on Voter Intimidation (Georgetown Univ. Law School)

Guide for Election Observers (Orange County, CA)

Guide to Physical Security (US Election Assistance Commission)  This is one chapter of a larger guide. It takes an IT-security focus but has relevance for broad physical security questions.

Cyber-Security Tool (US Election Assistance Commission)

Observer Laws and Policies by State (National Conference of State Legislatures)

Election Observer Guide (Arapahoe County, CO)

Managing Expectations for Slower Election Results in 2020 (Elections Group)